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Necessary Intrusion or
Criminalising the Innocent?
An Exploration of Modern
Criminal Vetting
Chris Baldwin*
Abstract This article considers the processes of criminal vetting and out-
lines the legislative framework allowing such disclosures and subsequent
judicial interpretation of that framework. The focus is on disclosure of
non-conviction (so-called ‘soft’) materials on ‘enhanced’ certiﬁcates and
subsequent challenges to those disclosures at judicial review. Key cases are
analysed, including R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of West
Midlands Police (2004) and R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) (2009). The proportion-
ality test in R (L) is noted and its subsequent application in the recent
decisions of R (on the application of C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester;
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011) and R (on the application of
B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary (2011) is scrutinised. The
article also highlights interference in Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (right to privacy) and questions whether inter-
ference can be justiﬁed, and whether the present judicial focus on right of
representations in such cases is misplaced.
Keywords Criminal Records Bureau; Vetting; Disclosure; En-
hanced certiﬁcates; Privacy
The UK has a long history of vetting potential employees with regard to
criminal convictions. This culminated in the establishment of the Crim-
inal Records Bureau (CRB) in 2002. The CRB has the authority to issue
either ‘standard disclosure certiﬁcates’ or ‘enhanced disclosure certiﬁ-
cates’ per Part V of the Police Act 1997. Enhanced certiﬁcates allow for
chief police ofﬁcers, at their discretion, to disclose non-conviction
material as well as ordinary conviction information. This discretion has
been used widely and, among the few commentators focusing on this
issue, such usage has proven extremely controversial.
Judicial interpretation of the legislative power has ranged from the
ordinarily subordinate to the occasionally bellicose. In 2009, the Su-
preme Court passed a landmark judgment in R (on the application of L)
(FC) (Appellant) v  Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent)1
which created a new test for the disclosure of so-called ‘soft materials’
for those persons whose employment required that an enhanced certiﬁ-
cate be obtained. This test was intended to replace the old test laid down
by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of the
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doi:10.1350/jcla.2012.76.2.761West Midlands Police.2 The central tenet of the judgment in R (L) was that
there should be no longer a presumption in favour of disclosure, but
rather a new test founded upon that most pernicious judicial chestnut,
‘proportionality’. In electing to declare that there now existed in all cases
a need to balance the protection of vulnerable people against the rights
of those damaged by enhanced disclosure, the court swept away the R
(X) presumption that information should be disclosed ‘if it might be
true’.
It is now two years since the passing of a judgment which some
predicted would prove the high-water mark of vetting.3 This is a multi-
faceted area of law which carries much social and legal signiﬁcance in
spite of a relatively low level of academic or public scrutiny. This article
will attempt to consolidate and evaluate the judicial interpretation of the
legislative framework of the CRB and disclosure certiﬁcates; ﬁrst, by
outlining that framework and, indeed, the remit of the CRB itself;
secondly, through an extrapolation of the tests, and their application,
which have governed the disclosure of so-called soft material and,
ﬁnally, by examining the subsequent application of the R (L) test in
decided cases to determine whether those predictions made in the
immediate aftermath of R (L) have proven accurate.
Background
It is clear that we must have effective measures for sharing information
about potentially dangerous individuals. However, those measures must be
proportionate and allow for representations to be made before information
is disclosed. Unless the procedures are changed, the careers of many
individuals will be ruined for no substantiated reasons. And the people
who will suffer will be the very children and vulnerable adults that the
Bichard Report4 intended to help.5
It has long been accepted, in the UK and many other EU countries,6 that
employers have the right to make background checks against pro-
spective and incumbent staff to verify their suitability for employment.7
In England, this right may be traced to Henry Fielding, who in the 1740s
instituted the post of ‘Register Clerk’, whose responsibility it was to
record both any crimes reported and the names of those suspected of
involvement and/or convicted. Fielding’s register was, in 1749, to form
the basis of the Universal Register Ofﬁce, ‘a labour exchange where
2 [2004] EWCA Civ 1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65.
3 For example, T. Pitt-Payne, ‘Employment—The Shadow of the Past’ (2009) 159
NLJ 1530.
4 The Bichard Inquiry Report, HC653 (2004), available at http://www.bichardinquiry.
org.uk/10663/report.pdf, accessed 20 February 2012. This report was the result of a
public inquiry into the circumstances of Ian Huntley ﬁnding himself employed in a
position from which he could commit the Soham murders of Holly Wells and
Jessica Chapman.
5 A. Mazzola, ‘Tainted Records’ Law Society Gazette, 19 August 2010, 6 at 7.
6 N. Loucks, O. Lyner and T. Sullivan, ‘The Employment of People with Criminal
Records in the European Union’ (1998) European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research at 195.
7 T. Thomas, ‘Employment Screening and the Criminal Records Bureau’ (2002) 31
Industrial Law Journal 55.
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141employers might examine prospective servants and study their char-
acter references’.8
In the two-and-a-half centuries which followed, extensive mechan-
isms were developed for the control and administration of criminal
record checks which were, by the 1990s, rather piecemeal and unsatis-
factory.9 In 1993 a government consultation document was drafted and
issued to review the system of police disclosures10 to general public
indifference.11 The resultant ﬁndings were duly published in 1996.12 The
subsequent White Paper proposed a legislative framework for all dis-
closures, the widening of disclosures to all employers and employees,
including vetting for voluntary positions, and the abolition of cost-free
disclosures in favour of a fee-paying system.13 Additionally, the adminis-
tration of disclosures was to be taken from local police forces and placed
into the hands of a single, central administrative body.14 One of the last
acts of the outgoing Conservative Government in 1997 was the in-
troduction and implementation of the Police Act 1997 which contained,
in Part V, statutory footing for these recommendations almost in their
entirety.
The Criminal Records Bureau
The Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) was established in March 2002 to
administer, on behalf of the Secretary of State,15 requests from employ-
ers for background checks against applicants for jobs and those already
employed by them.16 Based in Liverpool, the CRB is run as a public–
private partnership with Capita Group plc.17 Prior to its inception, the
Labour Government demonstrated a relish for vetting which mirrored
that of its predecessor, exempliﬁed by some typically bombastic public
declarations:
It is especially important that employers and voluntary organisations
should be able to access information about criminal convictions when
checking the suitability of those who will be working with children, young
people and vulnerable adults. Access to this information will provide an
important additional safeguard.18
All applications for background checks must now be made directly to the
CRB. A disclosure cannot be made unless the named person subject to
8 See Bichard, above n. 4 at 56.
9 For a comprehensive examination of these developments, see Thomas, above n. 7
at 55–67.
10 Home Ofﬁce, Disclosure of Criminal Records for Employment Vetting Purposes, Cm 2319
(1993).
11 See Bichard, above n. 4 at 63.
12 Home Ofﬁce, On the Record: The Government’s Proposals for Access to Criminal Records
for Employment and Related Purposes in England and Wales, Cm 3308 (1996).
13 See Thomas, above n. 7 at 60.
14 Ibid.
15 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3 at [4].
16 H. Hart, ‘Checking Up’ (2008) 158 NLJ 237.
17 Ibid.
18 Charles Clarke MP, Home Ofﬁce, Criminal Record Checks to Protect Children and
Vulnerable Adults on the Way, Press Release, 3 August 2000.
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142the application consents.19 This is evidenced by signature on the pro-
scribed form. Upon receipt of a request for a check made in the pre-
scribed manner and accompanied by the requisite fee,20 the CRB make
individual requests to relevant police forces to peruse the Police National
Computer (PNC)21 and refer any ﬁndings directly to the CRB so that a
disclosure certiﬁcate can be drafted and released back to the applicant.
Disclosure certiﬁcates
There are two types of certiﬁcate:
The  ﬁrst is a Standard Criminal Records Bureau Certiﬁcate, generally
referred to as either a ‘standard CRB’ or the ‘standard certiﬁcate’.22 This
will provide details of any warnings, reprimands, cautions or convictions
recorded on the PNC against the applicant.23 No distinction is made
between convictions which are ‘spent’ or ‘unspent’,24 both are
disclosed.25
The second disclosure is an Enhanced Criminal Records Bureau
Certiﬁcate—the so-called ‘enhanced CRB’ or ‘enhanced certiﬁcate’. An
employer or organisation wishing to carry out these enhanced back-
ground checks must apply to the Criminal Records Bureau to be granted
the status of a ‘registered body’. Enhanced certiﬁcates are not issued
generally; they may only be made in the exceptional circumstances as
prescribed by statute.26 Such circumstances generally arise only where
the staff of an organisation might have regular access to children or
‘vulnerable adults’, such as schools, hospitals, colleges and various
voluntary and charitable organisations.27
The enhanced certiﬁcate is double-sided. The face of the certiﬁcate
contains all of the materials disclosed on a ‘standard’ certiﬁcate, as well
as relevant information from the controversial Vetting and Barring
Scheme (VBS) as administered by the Independent Safeguarding
Authority.28 The reverse of the enhanced certiﬁcate, however, allows for
the chief ofﬁcer of any police force to disclose any material which he or
she feels might be relevant to the application.29 The discretion for deter-
mining whether or not material may be relevant lies solely with the
19 Police Act 1997, s. 115 (when fully in force s. 163 of the Serious Organised Crime
and Police Act 2005 repeals ss 113 and 115 of the 1997 Act and inserts ss 113A–
113F (Criminal Record Certiﬁcates)).
20 Ibid.
21 See Hart, above n. 14 at para. 2.
22 Police Act 1997, s. 113.
23 Police Act 1997, Part V, extrapolated by S. Mason, A Common Sense Approach—A
Review of the Criminal Records Regime in England and Wales (Home Ofﬁce: London,
2011) 13, available at http://www.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/publications/crime/criminal-records-
review-phase1/common-sense-approach?view=Binary, accessed 20 February 2012.
24 As determined by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.
25 Ibid.
26 Police Act 1997, s. 115(2).
27 See Mason, above n. 23 at 5.
28 The VBS replaced the Protection of Children Act List, the Protection of Vulnerable
Adults List and the infamous List 99 of persons barred by the executive from
working with children. These changes were implemented with the inception of
the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006.
29 Police Act 1997, s. 115(7) (Police Act 1997, s. 113B(4), when in force).
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143chief ofﬁcer and ‘responding to this request may not be a ﬁnite factual
matter, but could, and very often would, require an exercise of judge-
ment by the chief ofﬁcer’.30 Whilst guidance and counter-guidance has
been issued since the inception of the enhanced disclosure certiﬁcate,31
there is no absolute rule applicable to the discretionary disclosure and
applicants usually have no way of knowing what will be disclosed, if
anything, until the certiﬁcate is issued.32 Previous discretionary dis-
closures have included unsubstantiated claims which resulted in the
suspect being released without charge,33 details of an applicant’s non-
criminal family history,34 the association of individuals with persons
convicted of an offence (though the applicant himself was never sus-
pected of any offence)35 and details of cases which proceeded to court
but resulted in an acquittal.36 Such disclosed, non-conviction material is
generally referred to as soft material or a soft disclosure.37
The issues
Soft disclosures on enhanced certiﬁcates are not an inconsequential side
issue. In 2007/08, the total number of enhanced certiﬁcates was
215,640; of these, around 8 per cent (17,560) contained discretionary,
soft disclosures. The total number of enhanced certiﬁcates issued in-
creased in 2008/09 to 274,877; again, around 8 per cent (21,045) of
these contained soft disclosures.38
Certiﬁcate disclosure is made simultaneously to both applicant and
the employer. The process of simultaneous disclosure was designed to
prevent tampering or altering of a certiﬁcate and to improve the speed
and efﬁciency of the recruitment process.39 However, simultaneous
disclosure brings considerable disadvantages. In R (on the application of S)
v  Chief Constable for West Mercia Constabulary,40 the court recognised
that:
Firstly, it incorrectly assumes the employer can make a decision imme-
diately on receipt of the certiﬁcate when, in reality, the disclosure forms
30 Desmond v Chief Constable of Nottingham Police [2011] EWCA Civ 3 at [4], per
Williams J.
31 See, e.g., Home Ofﬁce Circular, Criminal Records Bureau: Local Checks by Police Forces
for the purposes of Enhanced Disclosure, 5/2005, available at http://www.homeofﬁce.gov.
uk/about-us/corporate-publications-strategy/home-ofﬁce-circulars/circulars-2005/005-2005/,
accessed 20 February 2012.
32 Mason, above n. 23 at 24.
33 R (on the application of John Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police
[2008] EWHC 1442 (Admin).
34 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3.
35 R (on the application of SL) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2008] EWHC
1442 (Admin).
36 R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable for West Mercia Constabulary [2008] EWHC
2811 (Admin).
37 See, e.g., Pitt-Payne, above n. 3 at para. 2.
38 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3 at [42].
39 See Mason, above n. 23 at 24.
40 [2008] EWHC 2811 (Admin).
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144only a part of the recruitment process. Secondly, there is no opportunity for
the applicant to challenge any of the information contained on the certiﬁ-
cate before it is seen by the employer.41
The result of a soft disclosure against an applicant is often ‘devastating’.42
In R (L), the Supreme Court accepted that such disclosure will have a
‘highly signiﬁcant impact on the applicant’.43 This is because, more often
than not, the applicant will be ‘effectively shut off forever from all
employment opportunities in a large number of different ﬁelds’.44 The
result is that any opportunity for work which might involve supervisory
responsibility for children or vulnerable adults will almost certainly be
lost entirely to the applicant, who may have undergone considerable
training and education to excel in a certain ﬁeld, only to ﬁnd then that
he or she is now barred from that ﬁeld for life. It is also true that ‘the
present culture, at least in its historical sense, can be said to be unusually
risk-averse and judgemental’45 and so an employer will usually treat a
prospective employee with a ‘non-clean’ certiﬁcate as too much of a risk
to make his or her employment viable. A soft disclosure, so far as the
applicant is concerned, is usually ‘a killer blow’.46
The damaging effect of a soft disclosure is not conﬁned merely to the
position of employment which is the subject to the disclosure; there also
exists damage to the private life of the applicant. Where a person is
denied access to his or her chosen ﬁeld of employment, this will ad-
versely affect his or her ability to develop social relationships with
others.47 Being barred from employment will naturally create unpleas-
ant ﬁnancial repercussions which too will affect a person’s ability to
enjoyment of his or her private life.48 Moreover, a soft disclosure may
have a negative impact on the reputation of an applicant. Mud sticks. If
a person is excluded from employment, this is likely to ‘get about’49 and
this can cause a ‘signiﬁcant stigma’50 to that individual.
The justiﬁcation for such draconian interference into an applicant’s
privacy, however, is that the public, and especially children and vulner-
able adults, have the right to be protected from those who may cause
them harm. Concurrently, the state has an equal obligation to do
whatever it deems necessary to protect these vulnerable members of
society. Indeed, and perhaps understandably, the protection of these
41 Above n. 40 at [24]–[25].
42 Ibid.
43 [2008] EWHC 2811 (Admin) at [68], per Lord Neuberger.
44 Ibid.
45 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3 at [75].
46 Ibid.
47 In R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3 at
[30], per Baroness Hale.
48 Ibid at [31].
49 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3 at [24].
50 Ibid.
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145groups has been described as both ‘a pressing social need’51 and  ‘a
laudable exercise’.52
Applicants faced with a damaging, discretionary disclosure may chal-
lenge that disclosure in two ways. They may either utilise the executive
procedure for challenge built into the operation mechanism of the CRB,
or, as a last resort, may issue proceedings in judicial review. The former
allows a challenge on factual grounds—that is to say that an error of fact
has been made on the certiﬁcate. This, naturally, leaves little scope for
challenge against a soft disclosure, which is discretionary by nature and
therefore can rarely be said to be, in strict terms, factually erroneous.
The latter, however, have largely focused upon the apparent contra-
diction between the provisions of the Police Act 1997 and the qualiﬁed
right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
The application of R (X): the high-water mark
The ﬁrst notable challenge against soft disclosure came in R (on the
application of X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police.53 X applied for an
enhanced certiﬁcate at the request of his employers, an agency dealing
with social care, for whom he had worked without incident since 1990.
X had no convictions of any kind and was a man of good character. This
was reﬂected on the face of his enhanced certiﬁcate. However, the
Deputy Chief Constable of West Midlands Police elected to make the
following discretionary disclosure against the applicant:
It is alleged that on 11 December 2001 [the claimant] indecently exposed
himself to a female petrol station attendant. It is further alleged that this
was repeated on 7 May 2002. [The claimant] was arrested and interviewed
whereby he stated that he did not think he had committed the offence but
that he was suffering from stress and anxiety at the time. [The claimant],
who was employed by a child care company at the time of the alleged
offences, was charged with two counts of indecent exposure, however the
alleged victim failed to identify the suspect during a covert identiﬁcation
parade, and the case was subsequently discontinued.54
Upon receipt of this disclosure in 2002, X was dismissed by the agency
from his employment. X immediately sought judicial review, primarily
on the grounds that Article 8(1) was engaged and that, so engaged, the
disclosure did not satisfy the requirements of Article 8(2). X also argued
that, prior to the implementation of the 1997 Act, the common law
presumption was against disclosure.55
51 R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2004] EWCA Civ
1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65 at [37].
52 R (on the application of L) (FC) (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(Respondent) [2009] UKSC 3, [2010] AC 410 at [84].
53 [2004] EWCA Civ 1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65.
54 Ibid. at [21].
55 Albeit that the presumption was demonstrated previously in family law cases (see
Re C (A Minor) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [1996] 2 FLR 725).
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146At the High Court, Wall J found in favour of X. This decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeal by the Chief Constable of West Mid-
lands Police where, unfortunately for X, he found the Lord Chief Justice
in an unsympathetic mood. Refuting the applicant’s arguments, Lord
Woolf CJ declared that the information disclosed was such that ‘a
reasonable employer in this ﬁeld would want to know’56 and that X was,
in effect, ‘seeking to prevent that information being available’.57 The
Article 8 submissions were dealt with equally as dismissively, with the
court decreeing that the Secretary of State, acting within his role under
the Police Act, cannot possibly be in breach of Article 8(1) when the Act
itself is enough to satisfy the qualiﬁcation of Article 8(2).58 As to the
presumption against disclosure, Lord Woolf CJ declared baldly that
‘there is no presumption against disclosure’;59 indeed, the court felt that
the Police Act created a position which would, if anything, be more in
favour of disclosure than against.60 The only question left to answer was
as to when a soft disclosure should be made:
This was obviously required by Parliament because it was important (for
the protection of children and vulnerable adults) that the information should
be disclosed even if it only might be true. If it might be true, the person who was
proposing to employ the claimant should be entitled to take it into account
before the decision was made as to whether or not to employ the claimant.
This was the policy of the legislation in order to serve a pressing social
need.61
For these reasons, the court unanimously found in favour of the appel-
lant. Seven years after the judgment, several comments can be made.
The ﬁrst is that the applicant X was certainly a cruel victim of circum-
stance. The judgment in R (X) came barely six months after Ian Huntley
was convicted at the Old Bailey of the infamous Soham murders of
schoolchildren Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman. At his trial, it emerged
that Huntley, a school caretaker, was known to the police, but that
information which might have prevented his being employed, if dis-
closed, was not so released. This case exposed, into the full glare of the
public, the ﬂaws inherent in the vetting system and the horriﬁc, if rare,
consequences of those ﬂaws. That Lord Woolf CJ felt the legislation
served a ‘pressing social need’ is perhaps unsurprising when that back-
drop is factored into the judgment. Secondly, it was immediately appar-
ent that, when weighing a balance between the right of the applicant to
privacy and this ‘pressing social need’, the court strongly believed that
the latter outweighed the former by an immeasurable degree. The
disadvantage suffered by the applicant registered barely a murmur of
sympathy from the court.
56 R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2004] EWCA Civ
1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65 at [44].
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid. at [41].
59 Ibid. at [36].
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. at [47] (emphasis added).
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147No longer would it be that a person is innocent until proven guilty;
rather a person may be innocent in law, but if something accused of him
only might be true, it should be disclosed regardless. Two elements
ought be considered here. First, the threshold for disclosure in R (X) was
staggeringly low. This might be true test may naturally be contrasted with
the traditional beyond all reasonable doubt standard of proof ordinarily
applied to matters which are of a criminal nature, and the two appear to
exist at very opposite ends of the spectrum. The second important issue
is that the arbiter of this test is a chief police ofﬁcer. That decision would
be made in private and subjectively, without any opportunity for the
applicant to make a representation prior to disclosure. This smacks of a
mechanical, rigid system which would likely cause signiﬁcant damage to
many thousands of unfortunate individuals with little or no chance of
successfully raising a legal challenge against these disclosures. Moreover,
justifying such a damaging interference into the private life of an inno-
cent applicant with the notion of ‘a reasonable employer wanting to
know’ such information was, it is  submitted, thoroughly spurious; that
someone wants to know a piece of private information cannot be so
simply equated with that same person having the right to know of it!
The decision in R (X), and in particular the disclose if material might be
true test, were subjected to considerable critical analysis62 and time has
palpably failed to dim the deep dissatisfaction generated by this remark-
able, roundabout attack on the presumption of innocence in English
law.
The high-water mark: subsequent application of R (X)
Presented with a legal yardstick which was both extremely subjective
and almost uniquely low, the police unsurprisingly proceeded to disclose
soft material with something approaching impunity. As predicted, appli-
cants disadvantaged by the new test found challenges to their enhanced
certiﬁcates generally given a short shrift. In the immediate aftermath,
the only (and rather vague) challenge to the new test came in R (on the
application of B) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,63 the result of
which was an immediate approval and application of the R (X) test, with
Munby J acceding to a damaging soft disclosure on the ground that ‘it
cannot be said that the evidence of possible wrongdoing [in the im-
mediate case] was so weak, so unreliable or so triﬂing that it cannot be
true’.64
The next notable application for judicial review of a soft disclosure
came in R (on the application of John Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames
Valley Police.65 Pinnington, so incensed at his disclosure that he waived
62 See, e.g., Pitt-Payne, above n. 3.
63 [2006] EWHC 579.
64 Citing the judgment of Bean J at ﬁrst instance [2005] EWHC 3212.
65 [2008] EWHC 1870.
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148his right to anonymity and embarked upon a media campaign to high-
light awareness to his plight,66 had been a long-serving deputy principal
of a college for autistic young adults in Oxford. As part of a working
reshufﬂe, Pinnington was required to apply for an enhanced CRB
certiﬁcate. He was a man of good character and no convictions were
recorded on the certiﬁcate issued in September 2005. However, on the
reverse of the certiﬁcate, the Assistant Chief Constable of Thames Valley
Police elected to make a discretionary disclosure relating to three separ-
ate allegations of sexual abuse by the applicant reported between
2002–05. The evidence demonstrated that the applicant was inter-
viewed in respect of one of these allegations and denied any wrongdoing
at all times. No charges were raised in respect of any of the allegations
and the matters were all dropped. As a result of the disclosure, Pinning-
ton was dismissed from his employment.67
Pinnington’s legal representatives evidently believed the R (X) test so
deeply entrenched that they elected simply not to challenge the certiﬁ-
cate on that ground,68 instead attempting to persuade the court that the
decision to issue an enhanced certiﬁcate was ﬂawed on the facts of the
unfounded allegations which, they submitted, could not possibly be
true.69 The court was unmoved. Rejecting what it purported to be, albeit
obliquely, ‘an attempt to impose a higher threshold than the relatively
low threshold inherent in the question whether the information might
be true’,70 Richards LJ conﬁrmed that the only other ground of chal-
lenge against the decision to disclose be ‘a straightforward Wednesbury
test, to which no gloss needs to be or should be applied’.71 As a result, the
application for judicial review was dismissed; whilst accepting that ‘none
of the allegations could be substantiated in a court of law’72 the low
threshold test in R (X) means that the decision to disclose could not be
unreasonable.73
The softening process?
Pinnington demonstrated once more the sheer scale of difﬁculty faced by
applicants as the courts continued to acquiesce to the notion that an
applicant be ‘guilty until proven innocent’.74 However, in spite of the
strict application of R (X) preferred by the Court of Appeal in Pinnington,
Richards LJ took the time to make some pertinent observations:
66 See, e.g., ‘John Pinnington sacked after CRB check reveals unsubstantiated abuse
allegations’, Daily Telegraph, 29 June 2008, and also ‘Presumed Guilty; the loving
stepfather devoted to helping autistic youngsters now ﬁghting to clear his name’,
Daily Mail, 27 August 2008.
67 R (on the application of John Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police
[2008] EWHC 1870 at [1].
68 Ibid. at [45].
69 Ibid. at [2]–[3].
70 Ibid. at [47].
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. at [55].
73 Ibid. at [47].
74 [2008] IDS Emp L Brief 862/2.
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149I recognise how painful such disclosure must be for the claimant, and how
damaging its consequences may be . . . I am troubled by the fact that the
claimant’s new employer in this case apparently operated a blanket policy
of insisting on a ‘clean’ certiﬁcate, so that the disclosure of the three
allegations led inevitably to the claimant’s dismissal on the transfer of his
employment to that employer on a reorganisation at work. The legislation
imposes a relatively low threshold for disclosure in the certiﬁcate in order
to enable an employer to make a properly informed decision. But it is
important that employers understand how low that threshold is and the
responsibility that it places in practice upon them. A properly informed
decision requires consideration not only of the information disclosed in the
certiﬁcate but also of any additional information or explanation that the
employee may provide. The operation of a blanket policy of insisting on a
‘clean’ certiﬁcate leaves no room for taking into account what the em-
ployee may have to say. That is a matter of particular concern.75
This was a welcome diversion from the attitude in R (X), where almost
no heed was paid to the damaging nature of the disclosure to the
applicant. Not before time, the court had come to recognise the anguish
that invariably results from soft disclosure.
Interestingly, decisions soon followed Pinnington which demonstrated
that, though strictly applied, the test in R (X) was not insurmountable. In
R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary,76 S,
a 49-year-old man who had played and coached rugby union for most of
his adult life, was required to apply for an enhanced certiﬁcate to ensure
re-election to the coaching staff of his local rugby club. Some three years
earlier, and unbeknown to the rugby club, S had been arrested and
charged with two counts of indecent exposure for which he was eventu-
ally brought to summary trial. Alibi evidence at that trial proved con-
clusively that S could not have been the individual who had exposed
himself and he was duly acquitted. This entire episode was revealed to
the rugby club by means of a soft disclosure on the applicant’s enhanced
certiﬁcate.
The application for judicial review was upheld. Whilst accepting that
‘the claimant has had to surmount a high hurdle’77 in order for the
application to succeed, the court nonetheless decided that ‘in this case,
however, he has done so’78 and so afﬁrmed that the decision to disclose
was  Wednesbury unreasonable. However, in so doing, the court ex-
pressed in ﬁrm terms that the decision was very much based upon the
individual facts of the case,79 rather than a discrete attempt to relax the
R (X) test. It was also stressed that a simple acquittal would not sufﬁce to
render a soft disclosure unreasonable; rather the circumstances of the
acquittal should be considered the decisive factor,80 with a distinction to
be drawn between an acquittal which arises as the result of a reasonable
75 R (on the application of John Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police
[2008] EWHC 1870 at [58]–[59].
76 [2008] EWHC 2811 (Admin).
77 Ibid. at [69].
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid. at [70].
80 Above n. 76.
The Journal of Criminal Law
150doubt in the mind of the arbiter of the alleged offender and those
circumstances where it is ‘very unlikely’ that the accused has committed
the offences.81 In the former, a decision to disclose will likely be reason-
able, whilst in the latter it may not.82 Quite how such a distinction be
determined was not made clear, though the processes of the court in R
(S) seem to indicate that the application for judicial review will, in these
circumstances, involve a reappraisal of the original case facts by the
court to determine the state of mind of the original arbiter. This seemed
to add yet another unwelcome subjective element to a process already
unduly laden.
Almost simultaneous to the decision in R (S) was the decision in R (on
the application of SL) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.83 SL, a
52-year-old homosexual male of good character, had been in a long-
term relationship with a man named Irvin. Irvin had previously been
questioned by police after a small trailer in a substantial video cache of
otherwise legal pornography was found to contain men under the legal
age applicable to such material. Irvin’s explanation, that he had no idea
about the trailer, satisﬁed investigating police ofﬁcers and the investiga-
tion was concluded with no charges brought. At no stage was SL
involved in this investigation or indeed questioned in relation to any
offence. Yet when he was required to obtain an enhanced certiﬁcate for
employment purposes, the police ofﬁcer chose to disclose his relation-
ship to Irvin and details of the pornography investigation.84
The application for judicial review was again upheld. Once more, the
court conducted what might best be described as a reappraisal of
the facts before insisting that ‘it is central to the proper exercise of the
functions given by the Police Act that an ECRC be particularised, accur-
ate and go no further than is strictly justiﬁed’.85 The court clearly felt
that, in this case, the certiﬁcate fell short of those standards and should
not have been issued in the form that was eventually disclosed.86
The decisions in both R (S) and R (SL) give rise to some interesting
observations. The ﬁrst is that the lower courts made plain their clear
subservience to the R (X) test. On neither occasion did either bench
entertain any proposal which might in some way dilute that test; prefer-
ring instead to rely upon means of interpretation to reach their re-
spective decisions. The second observation is that, in spite of this
subservience, the willingness of the court to scrutinise, in such minute
detail, the subjective decision of senior police ofﬁcers in the face of the
low-threshold test in R (X) marked a subtle, yet critical, shift from the
somewhat laissez-faire approach adopted by Lord Woolf CJ in R (X). In
declaring both subjective decisions unreasonable, the courts demon-
strated that the mood of the judiciary had begun to change. No longer
would any decision to disclose be accepted without consideration of the
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 [2008] EWHC 1442 (Admin).
84 Ibid. at [1]–[2].
85 Ibid. at [24].
86 Ibid. at [25].
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151repercussions to the applicant; justiﬁcations were now being sought. In
light of what followed, it is evident that these decisions demonstrated a
judicial ‘softening’ towards applicants as evidence of the damaging effect
that soft disclosures were having on the legally innocent began to
percolate the legal system.
The tipping point? The decision in R (L)
Just four years after the landmark decision in R (X), the Supreme Court
elected to hear an appeal against a soft disclosure in R (on the application
of L) (FC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.87 In R (L), L was the
mother of a child, referred to as X. Both L and X had come to the
attention of both the police and social services on account of the delin-
quent behaviour of X. A child protection conference took place in 2002,
a time when X was living with his father, rather than L. Concerns were
expressed that X might be exposed to illicit drugs and was involved in
numerous criminal acts. X was also excluded from school at that time for
assaulting a member of staff. As a result, X was placed on the child
protection register. In 2003, X was convicted of robbery and sentenced
to three years’ detention in a young offender institution and was re-
leased in February 2004.88 In 2004, L was employed as a midday
assistant at a secondary school. She shared her responsibilities with four
other staff.89 As part of her continuing employment, L was required to
obtain an enhanced certiﬁcate. This was issued on 16 December 2004.
The certiﬁcate conﬁrmed that L had no criminal convictions, but the
reverse of the certiﬁcate contained a detailed exposition of the problems
caused by her son, X. This had been disclosed discretionarily by the chief
police ofﬁcer. As a result, the employment agency employing L sum-
marily dismissed her from her position of employment.90 Her response
was to make an application for judicial review.
The judgment of the Supreme Court was handed down on 29 October
2009. By a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court elected to revise the decision
of the Court of Appeal in R (X). A number of key issues were raised. First,
the court considered whether or not the disclosure of soft material
engaged the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8(1). Lord Hope here
accepted that two elements were at play. The ﬁrst of these saw the ratio
of Baroness Hale in R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of State for
Health91 cited approvingly, namely that ‘excluding a person from her
chosen ﬁeld is liable to affect her ability to develop relationships with
others and have repercussions as regards earning a living’.92 Secondly,
an analysis of European decisions relating to the storing and release of
information on police computer systems was undertaken, noting that
whilst some criminal information (relating to convictions) might be in
87 [2009] UKSC 3, [2010] AC 410.
88 Ibid. at [13].
89 Ibid. at [14].
90 Ibid. at [15].
91 [2009] UKHL 3, [2009] 2 WLR 267.
92 R (on the application of L) (FC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC
3, [2010] AC 410 at [24].
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152the public domain, much information is private and the revival into the
public domain of information which has become stale through time
should also be considered as having an impact on a person’s private
life.93 The conclusion drawn was that disclosure of information in en-
hanced certiﬁcates did engage Article 8(1) and that such disclosures
would have an adverse impact on the applicant’s family life ‘in virtually
every case’94 and submissions refuting that Article 8(1) was so engaged
were rejected.
The next issue for consideration was whether or not that interference
in the Article 8(1) right was justiﬁed. Lord Hope considered the process
by which the chief ofﬁcer of police had come to his conclusion to
disclose.95 A rating table had been used96 which indicated that informa-
tion should be disclosed in accordance to a risk/consequence formula. It
was noted that this formula provided that an afﬁrmative decision on
disclosure of soft materials would occur any time that the risk posed by
the applicant, in the opinion of the chief ofﬁcer of police, was ‘severe’,
irrespective of the damage caused to the applicant by that disclosure.97 A
disclosure would also be made in all cases where the risk was moderate
unless the consequence of disclosure were to be considered ‘severe’98.
The court recognised that form MP9 was clear evidence that ‘the human
rights issue has been closely modelled on what Lord Woolf CJ said in R
(X)’.99
After a recital of the facts and the decision in R (X), Lord Hope turned
to whether or not the test in R (X) had struck the right balance between
the damage caused by the Article 8(1) interference and the need to
protect vulnerable groups.100 He sensibly conceded that ‘the effect [of R
(X)] is to encourage disclosure . . . and to give priority to the social
need’.101 According to the Police Act 1997, soft disclosure should be
made if the material is relevant and it ought be disclosed. This is a two-
part test and the latter implies a proper consideration of the impact on
the applicant of disclosure. Lord Hope declared ‘that in every case he
[the chief police ofﬁcer] must consider whether there is likely to be an
interference with the applicant’s private life, and if so whether that
interference can be justiﬁed’.102 It is the proper consideration of this
issue which effectively legitimises the legislation via Article 8(2).103 This
is (rightly) an essential requirement; indeed, if the latter is not given due
weight ‘there would be too many cases where the inclusion [of soft
materials] would represent an unwarranted invasion of the applicant’s
article 8 rights for the statutory provisions to survive an incompatibility
93 Above n. 92  at [27].
94 Ibid. at [29].
95 Ibid. at [30]–[34].
96 Referred to throughout as ‘MP9’.
97 R (on the application of L) (FC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC
3, [2010] AC 410 at [32].
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. at [34].
100 Ibid. at [41].
101 Ibid. at [38].
102 Ibid. at [40].
103 Ibid. at [38].
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153assault’.104 The fact that the applicant endorses the disclosure by sig-
nature is, and has always been, a deeply unsatisfactory mechanism for
defending the damage caused by disclosure; a point forcibly raised
through intervention by Liberty and endorsed by Lord Hope, who
suggested that ‘they consent to the application, but only on the basis that
their right to private life is respected’.105 This approach was expounded
upon by Lord Brown, who explained that ‘applicants are consenting to
the disclosure of relevant information to the extent that this is propor-
tionate to the damage this will cause . . . this is plainly right’.106 In a
dissenting judgment, Lord Scott took issue with this rebuttal, claiming
that ‘it is necessary to remember that it was she who applied for the
certiﬁcate’107 and that Lord Hope’s position was ‘an impossible one’.108 It
is submitted that the former position is far more agreeable than the
latter. The decision made by the applicant is, in almost every case, no
freely made decision at all; failure to apply for an enhanced certiﬁcate
would act ordinarily as a bar to the profession if such a disclosure is
requested. To suggest otherwise may be legally accurate, but it is a
nonsense in the practical reality of disclosure applications. Lord Hope’s
rebuttal of such claims is both welcome and long overdue, and it is
submitted that Lord Neuberger’s forceful and insightful consideration of
the matter, that the legislature cannot circumvent Convention rights by
including a ‘statutory fetter’ and then forcing a person to accept that
fetter in an attempt to avoid Convention obligations,109 should draw a
line under such arguments for good.
The issue, then, is one of proportionality.110 On the one hand, there
exists a very real risk to vulnerable members of society and the need for
the state to offer suitable protection. On the other hand, however, is the
right of individuals to have their private life respected and not to be
unduly damaged. This balancing act is ‘of the greatest importance’111
and ‘it is imperative in every case to ensure that the public interest in
safeguarding children really does justify the relevant disclosure’.112 The
test in R (X) was fatally attacked, with Lord Hope providing that ‘the
approach that was taken to this issue in R (X) has been to tilt the balance
against the applicant too far. It has encouraged the idea that priority
must be given to the social need to protect the vulnerable as against the
right to respect for private life of the applicant’.113 This did not give
enough weight to the essential provision of s. 115(7)(b) of the Police Act
1997. Therefore, ‘the balance struck by the Court of Appeal in R (X) ...
needs to be re-struck less favourably to the prospective employer’.114
104 Above n. 97  at [78].
105 Ibid. at [43].
106 Ibid. at [64].
107 Ibid. at [58].
108 Ibid. at [59].
109 Ibid. at [73].
110 Ibid. at [42]
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. at [63], per Lord Brown.
113 Ibid. at [44].
114 Ibid. at [63].
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154Two recommendations for this ‘re-striking’ were made; ﬁrst, proper
weight should be given to whether or not information ‘ought to be
included’ per s. 115(7)(b) of the Police Act 1997. It should no longer be
presumed that if material is relevant, the presumption is in favour of
disclosure. Secondly, in borderline cases, the applicant should be offered
the opportunity to make representations to the chief ofﬁcer of police. In
R (X), Lord Woolf CJ had strongly rejected this idea as ‘imposing too
heavy a burden’115 on the chief ofﬁcer of police. This approach was
rejected, with the view taken that, whilst not necessary in all cases, in
instances when there is room for doubt ‘the risks in such cases of causing
disproportionate harm to the applicant outweigh the inconvenience to
the chief constable’.116
The decision in R (L) was greeted with warm enthusiasm, described
rightly as ‘signiﬁcant and timely’117 for it is ‘essential to ensure that a
policy which affects millions of people is compliant with human
rights’.118 Indeed, it was suggested in the immediate aftermath that, by
its decision, ‘the Supreme Court has thankfully brought some wisdom
and balance to the current frenzy around employment vetting . . . this
judgment strikes a welcome note of caution and fairness’.119 These are
sentiments with which this author entirely agrees. The test in R (X),
which had led to a veritable plethora of soft material disclosures, had
been mercifully scrapped after only four years of operation in which
time untold damage had been done to some tens of thousands of
innocent people. A proper consideration of the damage to the applicant
was now a necessity, rather than the afterthought wrongly preferred in
R (X). In cases where the decision to disclose is marginal or where
disclosure would be especially damaging, the chief ofﬁcer of police now
had an obligation to seek representations from the applicant, rather than
simply erring on the side of caution and disclosing in almost all cases.
For L, however, the victory was to prove largely pyrrhic. In spite of
this new test, the Supreme Court still felt that soft disclosure was
proportionate; that the case was sufﬁciently clear cut not to require
representations to have been made and so upheld the disclosure deci-
sion nonetheless.
A half-turned tide? The decisions in R (C) and R (B)
It was suggested that the decision in R (L) would lead to a short-term,
immediate increase in judicial review challenges to soft disclosure in
enhanced certiﬁcates.120 The most notable challenge arose in R (on the
application of C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester; Secretary of State for
115 R (on the application of X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2004] EWCA
Civ 1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65 at [37].
116 R (on the application of L) (FC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC
3, [2010] AC 410 at [46].
117 Pitt-Payne, above n. 3.
118 K. Hughes, ‘Proportionality Not Presumption’ (2010) 69 Camb LJ 4 at 6.
119 A. Fairclough, ‘Supreme Court Rebalances Law on Enhanced CRB Disclosure’,
Liberty Press Release, 29 October 2009, 
120 Hughes, above n. 118.
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155the Home Department.121 C was a skilled welder who had applied for a
position as a lecturer in a sixth-form college. As part of his registration to
the Protocol National Database,122 C was required to obtain an enhanced
certiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate, issued in 2008, indicated that no criminal
convictions were recorded against the applicant.123 However, on the
reverse of the certiﬁcate a discretionary disclosure of soft intelligence
had been made. This indicated that an allegation of abuse had been
made by C’s stepdaughter. That allegation was initially made in 1994,
but was retracted by the child at her mother’s coercion.124 The same
allegations were made again, by the same female (by then an adult), in
2006. C was arrested and interviewed, where he denied the allegations.
The ﬁle was passed to the CPS, who decided that, although there was no
reason to disbelieve the accuser, there was insufﬁcient evidence to
charge C and the case was discontinued. Upon receipt of this disclosure
C sought ﬁrst to have it removed through negotiation. When this failed,
he sought judicial review.125
Initially, the judgment of the court seemed a relatively straight-
forward one. It was immediately apparent that the decision taken by the
police to disclose had been so done based upon the interpretation of the
legislative framework outlined in R (X) and so, in light of the decision in
R (L), ‘the decision made . . . cannot stand as a lawful decision’.126 This
alone was sufﬁcient to uphold the application for judicial review as the
disclosure decision was founded upon ﬂawed guidance.127
Having so found, Langstaff J then responded to the Chief Constable’s
assertion that disclosure would take place even if the R (L) test had been
applied with a remarkable rebuttal. In a lengthy extrapolation as to
whether or not such a disclosure would be proportionate, in accordance
to the new, R (L), test, the judge systematically reviewed the circum-
stances in the most minute detail. It was accepted by all parties that the
allegation against C might be true,128 however, this no longer being
the principal indicator of disclosure, such acceptance was not decisive.
The court considered that the allegation, though made twice, related to
a  ‘single offence’ and no other allegations against C had ever been
made.129 The good character of the claimant was also recognised.130 By
contrast, it was noted that the accuser had herself become known to the
121 [2010] EWHC 1601 (Admin).
122 Described by Langstaff J as a organisation to which any college lecturer must
register if he or she is to have any practical possibility of being employed in that
sector.
123 R (on the application of C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2010] EWHC 1601 (Admin) at [22].
124 It is important to note that, as papers submitted in evidence showed, the girl
admitted to both social services and the police that she ‘made up the allegation as
a means of seeking attention’ ([2010] EWHC 1601 at [29]). This was not noted in
the certiﬁcate.
125 R (on the application of C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2010] EWHC 1601 (Admin) at [23]–[24].
126 Ibid. at [33].
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid. at [47].
129 Ibid. at [48].
130 Ibid.
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156police and had convictions for, among offences, theft and assault.131
These would likely affect the credibility of the accuser (in contrast to the
certiﬁcate which provided that ‘there is no reason to disbelieve the
female’) if any of these convictions had stemmed from a trial in which
the accuser’s evidence under oath had been disbelieved.132 No record of
that issue had been made by the police.133 Finally, and decisively, the
court considered that the accusation related to an allegation of abuse
against a very young child in the privacy of the family home. The
position applied to by C was one in which he would only come into
contact  with minors of at least 16 years of age134 and very few, if any,
vulnerable adults135 in working conditions which were broadly public in
nature. The conclusion of the judge was that whilst the risk posed was
‘either low or very low’,136 the damage caused by the disclosure was
high137 with the result that ‘I cannot see that a decision which would
inevitably have the consequence that C would not secure any work at all
in his chosen profession would be proportional to a risk which, though
existing, would be low. It follows that I cannot say that the decision is
plainly and obviously right’.138 To ensure that the Chief Constable did
not elect to re-disclose against C, the court concluded by awarding
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent any future disclosure of the
matter referred to in the certiﬁcate.
This level of scrutiny of both the decision-making process and the
decision itself saw the judge depart markedly from those before him.
Here was a judgment that did not merely talk about proportionality in
general, vague terms; instead it was precisely the sort of extensive
exposition of proportionality that the statutory framework surely de-
manded. It might have been hoped that the balancing act advocated so
lucidly in C should provide much-needed guidance into precisely what
sort of processes a reasonable chief ofﬁcer of police might undertake in
the performance of his duties under s. 113 of the Police Act 1997.
Alas, those hopes were not to last for long. The Chief Constable was
somewhat less than impressed with having his decision overturned, and
with having been enjoined from ever re-disclosing against C, and so duly
appealed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was handed down on 19
January 2011.139 The broad arguments on both sides remained the
same, and the Court of Appeal took a three-fold approach. First, both
the appellant and the court accepted that the original decision had been
founded upon a procedural irregularity,140 but the appellant maintained
that no injustice had been done as the correct decision would have been
131 Above n. 125 at [39].
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid. at [36].
135 Ibid. at [48].
136 Ibid. at [47].
137 The court accepted that a disclosure would bar the applicant from his chosen
profession entirely (ibid. at [51]).
138 Ibid.
139 R (on the application of C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2011] EWCA
Civ 175.
140 Ibid. at [8].
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157to disclose the soft intelligence in any event.141 The court, infuriatingly,
refused to be drawn on the merits of the disclosure, stating baldly that
‘all that is for the chief constable’142 and instead focused upon the refusal
of the Chief Constable to allow representations to be made. It was said
that ‘it would be unwise to gloss, or add, to the R (L) test [regarding
when representations should be invited by the chief ofﬁcer of police].
The question is ultimately fact speciﬁc’.143 To these particular facts,
Toulson LJ asked himself a rhetorical question: ‘Was it obvious that
nothing that he [the applicant] could have said could rationally or
sensibly have inﬂuenced the mind of the Chief Constable?’.144 In this
present case, his Lordship could not agree that the answer was an
‘obvious yes’.145 In the circumstances, representations should have been
invited, though these need not necessarily be in the form of an oral
hearing; they can be made in ‘a much simpler form than that’.146 The
court then considered that the chief ofﬁcer of police might feel initially
that no representations need be made, but a pre-action letter should
state the grounds upon which an applicant feels aggrieved. Unless these
reasons do not merit any consideration at all, then the chief ofﬁcer of
police should at that stage give consideration to them to prevent un-
necessary expense and to relieve the courts from being ‘burdened with
judicial review applications based upon a failure of an opportunity to
make representations’.147
The result of these analyses was that the judge at ﬁrst instance was
right to quash the original certiﬁcate.148 However, the court then moved
to consider the declaratory relief and injunction. The court felt that
Langstaff J had jumped too far by declaring a decision ‘not plainly and
obviously right’ to one that was ‘thus plainly and obviously wrong’.149
That error was compounded by a second error in drafting an injunction
which forbade the chief ofﬁcer of police from disclosing whenever the
applicant sought a certiﬁcate ‘in relation to a position as an instructor,
lecturer or teacher of children over the age of 16 in an educational
setting’.150 This injunction would bind the chief ofﬁcer of police in the
event of new material coming to light which might favour disclosure,
and so was both too wide and unsatisfactory,151 resulting in the declarat-
ory relief and the injunction being set aside.152
After the refreshing decisiveness of the judgment at ﬁrst instance, the
appellate court had delivered a judgment of infuriating contrast. Whilst
the decision to uphold Langstaff J’s order to quash the original certiﬁcate
was satisfactory, the procedural irregularity upon which that decision
141 Above n. 139
142 Ibid. at [28].
143 Ibid. at [11].
144 Ibid. at [12].
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid. at [13].
148 Ibid. at [15].
149 Ibid. at [18].
150 Ibid. at [19].
151 Ibid. at [20].
152 Ibid. at [21].
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158was founded made that little more than a formality. Pleasingly, having
declared its unwillingness to ‘add to or gloss’ upon the principle in R (L),
the court seemed to have done precisely that by intimating that repre-
sentations should be requested more often than not, that the time and
effort involved for the chief ofﬁcer of police is not relevant and that even
a pre-action letter should trigger, in most circumstances, the considera-
tion of an applicant’s concerns. This guidance, which adds to the original
provided in R (L), is certainly welcome.
However, one must wonder why the court has decided to focus on the
representations issue at all. It seems that the principal motive for doing
so was a concern over the wasting of court time and the wasting of
money. Whilst these are certainly acceptable motives, it is unlikely that
the applicant C would describe these as pressing issues in the instant
case. Although it was true that C had raised the issue of representations
as an issue at ﬁrst instance, that issue had been rendered superﬂuous by
the measured scrutiny provided in that judgment. The ultimate issue for
determination was proportionality, not whether or not representations
should be made, and the latter must surely become irrelevant where the
chief ofﬁcer of police, as here, argued vociferously that his decision to
disclose would remain the same even had representations been made.
Having been afforded a wonderful opportunity to provide an illustration
of the R (L) principle, the Court of Appeal instead decided to absolve
itself of the responsibility and focus on a side issue.
It is not certain quite where this all leaves the applicant C. His
application for judicial review was initiated in order to overturn and
prevent a decision to make a soft disclosure. Such disclosure was a bar to
his chosen profession. That disclosure was declared by a judge as dis-
proportionate and so enjoined. His case won almost entirely, he now
ﬁnds that his disclosure certiﬁcate has been quashed, certainly, but not
on grounds of proportionality—on procedural grounds instead. The
effect of this is that the decision has now gone back to the chief ofﬁcer of
police, who has made clear in two court hearings that he wants to
disclose as he thinks it proportionate. He must, as the Court of Appeal
makes clear, allow C to make representations and give those his con-
sideration, but one can only presume that these will fall on deaf ears; the
entire basis of the chief ofﬁcer’s case has been that no injustice had been
done by disclosure. If the information is again disclosed, it would be a
considerable surprise if C does not once more raise litigation:153 after all,
he already has one judgment supporting his belief that disclosure is
disproportionate and the supporting obiter of another.154 The process
would then begin again, on largely the same evidence and on the same
153 Though the fresh decision is for the chief ofﬁcer of police, that decision remains
judicially reviewable (above n. 139 at [31]).
154 At the Court of Appeal in R (C), Lord Neuberger MR, who sat on both R (L) and R
(C), also took the time to emphasise that the differences in facts between those in
R (L) and those in the instant case were ‘very different’ and that the information
relating to C is ‘arguably not relevant . . . for the reasons given by the judge’(at
[31]). Promising for C though these words may be, the decision was still referred
back to the chief ofﬁcer of police.
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159arguments, with precisely the kind of waste of money and time that the
Court of Appeal seemed so keen to avoid.
It may be that C considers that the Court of Appeal have missed both
the point and an opportunity. It is hard to disagree.
In the later case of R (on the application of B) v  Chief Constable of
Derbyshire Constabulary,155 the chief ofﬁcer of police had elected to dis-
close information relating to B, a consultant in a mental health trust.156
B had been arrested in February 2010 after an allegation was made that
he had stabbed a man, who was known to B, at B’s own home in
December 2009. It was noted that no visible injury was evidenced at the
time of the arrest. It was also alleged that B had threatened the man’s
two children (aged 14 and 16) with a samurai sword and had damaged
his own property with the same sword. When the police searched B’s
home, they found a number of swords, ﬁrearms and ammunition. These
were lawfully owned, but were seized as they were not properly
stored.157 After his arrest, B made no comment during interview,158 but
ultimately the CPS dropped the case, in spite of pressure from the
police.159 However, when B applied for an enhanced certiﬁcate in Feb-
ruary 2010, the decision was made to disclose all of this soft material.
The certiﬁcate was issued on 11 May 2010.160 B instructed his solicitor to
write to the police and demand an unprecedented amount of doc-
umental disclosure. The police refused, but invited B to make written
representations to the chief ofﬁcer of police. By response, B instructed
counsel and issued proceedings.161
A variety of grounds were offered in an imaginative submission by B’s
counsel,162 but the Divisional Court found none to be persuasive. The
court dismissed submissions requesting wide-ranging documentary dis-
closure by police prior to the issue of the certiﬁcate as inconsistent with
the type of right to representations alluded to in both R (L) and R (C);
such wide-ranging disclosure would ‘not be the norm . . . It will surely
only be in a very unusual case, if at all, that anything approaching the
general disclosure sought here by the claimant could ever be appro-
priate’.163 An equally ambitious attempt to seek a declaration of incompat-
ibility was also emphatically struck down with R (L) cited as deﬁnitive
evidence that such a submission was ‘hopeless’.164 The issue, again, was
one of proportionality. Although the court accepted that an opportunity
to make representations should have been made prior to disclosure, that
155 [2011] EWHC 2362 (Admin).
156 Ibid. at [1].
157 Ibid. at [3].
158 Ibid. at [10].
159 Ibid. at [15]–[20].
160 Ibid. at [26].
161 Ibid. at [27].
162 Including various submissions relating to Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights which were given a short shrift by the court as a result of the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of G) v Governors of X
School [2011] UKSC 30, which unfortunately for B, was decided in the interim
period between the issue of proceedings and the judgment being handed down.
163 [2011] EWHC 2362 (Admin) at [61].
164 Ibid. at [64].
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160was not decisive, as every representation which might have been made
has been so made during the course of the litigation165 and in any event
‘this really is a very plain case’.166 The court viewed with approval what
must justly be described as a comprehensive documentary review of
proportionality, referred to as ‘AT3’, provided by the chief ofﬁcer of
police prior to disclosure, which noted the importance of the decision in
R (L) and provided a suitable extrapolation of the balance between the
need for disclosure and the likely damage caused to B in the event of
disclosure.167 In light of this, the court felt disinclined to interfere with
the chief ofﬁcer’s decision; the applicable test of review was ‘an assess-
ment of the balance which the decision maker has struck’168 and the
court, where there is a reasons challenge, ‘must not be astute to ﬁnd
failings’.169 As a result, the decision of the chief ofﬁcer of police was
upheld and the application for judicial review was rejected. 
What, then, may be drawn from these applications of the new test?
Two salient points may be made. It is interesting that the right to make
representations seems to be something that will apply to most, if not all
cases; in both R (C) and R (B) the court felt that the decision to disclose
would be sufﬁciently damaging as to warrant an opportunity to make
representations. This is certainly a marked departure from the position
in R (X), where it may be recalled that such a procedure would effect-
ively represent little more than an inexpedient waste of police time, and
a gratifying interpretation of the judgment in R (L). Additionally, it is
pleasing to note that the comprehensive scrutiny of the chief ofﬁcer of
police prior to disclosure in R (B). Document AT3, with over 200 pages of
attachments, demonstrates a welcome improvement from the piece-
meal, and often frankly desultory, consideration of proportionality pre-
viously offered by chief ofﬁcers. The lessons of R (C) seem to have been
learned. 
On the other hand, the court’s continued deference to the chief
ofﬁcer of police remains a source of frustration. Whilst the Divisional
Court in R (B) at least found the time to address the issue of actual review
of the chief ofﬁcer’s decision (unlike in R (C) where the Court of Appeal
elected to ignore that point and hope that no one would notice), the fact
remains that the courts appear thoroughly reluctant to interfere in a
decision that, under the literal interpretation of the Police Act 1997,
ultimately falls to the chief ofﬁcer of police. That is perhaps under-
standable where the decision is as comprehensive as that in R (B), with
facts which perhaps might favour disclosure, but there remains, it is
165 A point which the Court of Appeal seemed palpably to fail to grasp in R (C).
166 R (on the application of B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC
2362 (Admin) at [86].
167 Reproduced ibid. at [25].
168 Ibid. at [65], citing with approval the ratio in R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26.
169 R (on the application of B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC
2362 (Admin) at [66].
Modern Criminal Vetting: Necessary Intrusion or Criminalising the Innocent?
161submitted, a requirement for deﬁnitive guidance. In the absence of
parliamentary interference, that responsibility surely lies with the
judiciary.
Conclusion
Employers have long had the right to vet potential employees. This is
now the exclusive remit of the Criminal Records Bureau. The present
legislative framework allows for the disclosure of non-conviction
material on enhanced Criminal Records Bureau certiﬁcates. Such a
disclosure is an obvious interference with the right to privacy enshrined
in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is also a
blatant and direct challenge to the ‘golden thread’ of English law that is
the presumption of innocence. The former is justiﬁed by the qualiﬁca-
tion of Article 8(2) which allows interference into the privacy right
in accordance with the law. The latter has yet to be addressed, let
alone justiﬁed, though notions of ‘public protection’ arise sufﬁciently
often in judicial interpretation as to perhaps answer that unanswered
question.
The protection of children and vulnerable adults is an undeniably
essential function of the state. Where the state fails in that obligation, as
it did in the circumstances of the Soham murders, the results can be
catastrophic. Such results, however, are noteworthy because such
crimes are extremely rare. It is universally recognised that the vast
majority of abuse takes place in the home, not the workplace. Those
high-proﬁle, and mercifully infrequent, public instances like that which
occurred at Soham should not be used as justiﬁcation for the effective
criminalisation and marginalisation of citizens who have not been con-
victed of a criminal offence.
It must be questioned whether or not the state can possibly justify at
all such a wanton intrusion into the privacy of an individual as that
demonstrated in decided cases. It is not merely those suspected of an
offence who are ‘at risk’. It is remarkable that an applicant can be
subjected to a soft disclosure relating to the activities of other indi-
viduals. This is a form of guilt by association which should, frankly, be an
unacceptable form of vetting in any circumstance. Equally, if a dis-
closure can be made against an applicant who has been acquitted by a
criminal or appellate court, the natural question to ask is whether or not
that applicant has gained anything at all, save perhaps an escape from
criminal sanction, from that acquittal? The information would be dis-
closed if he or she had been convicted, and will be disclosed regardless of
the acquittal. That both categories of soft disclosure are deemed desir-
able, by the public, the executive and by the judiciary, is a troubling
marker of the risk-averse society in which we live.
There may be certain circumstances where a person is, despite a lack
of criminal convictions, such an obvious danger to society that soft
disclosure of the sort permitted on the enhanced certiﬁcate is justiﬁed.
These circumstances, however, must surely be the exception, rather
than the rule. It is barely credible to imagine that these circumstances
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162arise in near 20,000 instances every year. The state is using the weighti-
est of the proverbial sledgehammers to crack the smallest nut.
The judicial position regarding enhanced certiﬁcates has shifted
noticeably in a very short space of time, from the inexcusably low-
threshold test in R (X) to the more balanced, proportionate consideration
offered in R (L). That is to be welcomed, as is the recent examination of
the chief ofﬁcer’s decision-making process in R (B), which demonstrated
a gratifying acknowledgement of the proportionality issue on the part of
the police. Yet the bald statistics show that, of the three applicants to
suffer damaging soft disclosure under the new R (L) test, two found their
judicial review applications dismissed entirely and the third, C, was
returned to the discretion of a chief ofﬁcer of police who wanted to
disclose. It is too soon to state for certain whether or not the pendulum
has swung decisively, but the evidence thus far is less than promising.
There remain those who insist that such intervention can be justiﬁed,
that public policy somehow entitles the law to devastate the lives of tens
of thousands of people for the sake of preventing a tiny handful of some
of the rarest crimes. This author respectfully, but vehemently, disagrees.
By our Parliament, the police and the judiciary, we are criminalising the
innocent.
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